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5Economic Differentiation
This chapter examines the structure of economic inequality in the study vil-
lages. The analysis focuses on two points. First is the relationship between
individual economic status and access to and control over land and labor.
Farmer rights to land and the way to procure labor for cocoa production are
correlated with the existing economic inequality. The direction of changes in
the structure of economic inequality is also related to the local institutions
such as indigenous land tenure systems and various agrarian contracts. The
primary objective of this chapter, therefore, is to examine the relationships
between the differing economic status of individual farmers and the local
institution related to land and labor.
The second point is the relationship between sociocultural factors, such as
gender and villager life cycles, and economic inequality. Economic status
changes with the stages of an individual farmer’s life cycles. Such change is
also related to the gender-differentiated access to and control over productive
resources. As a result, some qualitative differences can be observed in the
future potentials for farmers to improve their economic status, depending on
their gender and age. By relating the analysis of economic inequality to
gender and farmer life cycle, it becomes possible to shed light on the diversity
of economic status of farmers and the direction of change in the structure of
economic inequality.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section I explains the method adopted
to extract the structure of economic inequalities in the study villages. This is
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followed by the examination of the relationship between economic inequality
and rights to productive resources (land and labor). The direction of changes
in the structure of economic inequality is then discussed. The concluding
section provides a brief summary of the findings of this chapter.
I. Wealth Ranking
The method adopted to identify the structure of economic inequalities in this
study is that of “wealth ranking” (Grandin 1988). Wealth ranking is a simple
field research technique through which the relative wealth status of villagers
in specific communities is extracted, based on the judgment of three or four
members of the community. This method had been used in previous academic
studies (DeWalt 1979; Hill 1972; IIED 1992; Scoones 1995) to identify the
economic status of households in a particular community. The effectiveness
of this method in revealing economic inequality has also been demonstrated
(Adams et al. 1997).
The structure of economic inequality in villages can also be extracted by
various other methods. Some scholars use a few indicators that are important
in a village economy (such as distribution of landholdings and output of
agricultural products) as the criteria of villagers’ economic status (Konings
1986). Others adopt the method of “possession score” in which the type and
quantity of consumer goods held are used to identify the economic status of
households (Sender and Smith 1990; Pincus 1996). Detailed household bud-
get survey can also be used to examine the economic status of each household.
Instead of these methods, the present study adopted the wealth-ranking method
for the following three reasons.
First is its simplicity. By using wealth ranking, a researcher can easily
extract the structure of economic inequality in a short period. In contrast,
conducting detailed household budget surveys requires much more time
and resources. A household budget survey has a strong advantage over
other methods because it can reveal the economic inequalities among villag-
ers in absolute terms, which makes it possible to compare the individual
economic status of different villages. Wealth ranking, on the other hand,
only reveals relative differences in villager wealth status. In other words,
it is not possible to compare the economic status of farmers in different
villages on the basis of the ranks extracted by the wealth-ranking method.
This is a major disadvantage of the method. However, the aim of the
present study is not to compare the economic status of farmers in quantitative
terms, but to identify the qualitative differences that affect farmers’ economic
status. Given the time and resource constraints of the survey, the advantage of
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wealth ranking in its simplicity outweighed its disadvantage.
Second, information obtained from the long-term residents of the villages
can reduce the bias in the information collected by outsiders who stay only in
the village itself for a short period in a particular year. For example, the data
on agricultural output or income for a particular year may not be adequate in
assessing a farmer’s economic status, because he or she may have a high
economic status but may be suffering from contingencies such as sickness or
crop diseases in that particular year. Similarly, if the data relies only on
agricultural output or landholdings, the economic status of a resident who
attains high economic position by means of nonfarm economic activities
cannot be adequately assessed. By relying on the judgments of long-term
residents, the wealth-ranking method can correct for these biases through the
incorporation of valuable knowledge of residents that cannot be easily ob-
tained by outsiders in a short-term survey.
Third, by using residents familiar with the village’s situation as the source
of information, it is possible to take into consideration economic activities
outside the village. Many residents in the study villages are migrants who
intend ultimately to return to their hometowns. They therefore tend to invest
income gained from cocoa production in activities outside their villages such
as house construction in their hometowns and higher education for their
children. The “possession score” method, which uses data on types and quan-
tities of consumer goods processed in the village, may not adequately reflect a
farmer’s economic status given the tendency not to remain permanently in the
study villages. In wealth-ranking methods, economic activities that are not
seen within the villages can be taken into account to a greater degree by using,
as the source of information, villagers who know the situation in the home-
towns of individual residents and the circumstances of their children.
A problem with wealth ranking is whether the informants selected have
enough knowledge of other villagers’ financial conditions. This was a serious
problem for the study villages where most of the residents are migrants from
different areas. To overcome the problem of insufficient knowledge, three to
four informants were selected based on the following three conditions: (1)
they had resided in the village for more than ten years and had sufficient
knowledge of individual villager circumstances; (2) there was no significant
imbalances in gender and age among the informants; and (3) their hometowns
were not concentrated in particular areas.
The procedure for extracting the structure of economic inequalities using
the wealth-ranking method followed that used by Grandin (1988) and IIED
(1992). Classification of villagers by wealth ranking was conducted on an
individual basis, given the fact that the unit of production and income man-
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agement in rural southern Ghana, as explained in Chapter 4, is the individual.
The results of the wealth-ranking survey are shown in Table 5-1. The follow-
ing section analyzes the relationship between the economic status of farmers
and their rights to productive resources (land and labor).
II. Land, Labor, and Economic Differentiation
In this section, the structure of economic inequality as extracted by the wealth-
ranking method is analyzed based on landholding, cocoa yield, agricultural
wage labor, landlord-tenant relationship, and nonfarm employment. The analy-
sis reveals the present state of economic inequality as well as factors that
cause the inequality. At the same time, the analysis points out the existence of
some factors that promote the equalization of wealth status.
1. Landholding and Economic Inequality
A close interrelationship can be observed between the wealth rank and
landholding (Tables 5-2 through 5-4, with rank 1 being the highest wealth
rank). The percentage of landholders among those placed in wealth rank 1 and
2 is higher, and that in wealth rank 5 is lowest. The same trend can also be
observed in the scale of landholdings with the average size declining as one
moves down the rankings (Tables 5-2 through 5-4). The percentage of farmers
holding land of over 10 hectares is highest among those placed in wealth rank
TABLE  5-1
WEALTH RANKING OF VILLAGERS
(No. of persons)
Rich Poor TotalRank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5
Bepoase
Male 7 10 11 11 16 55
Female 0 5 10 7 10 32
Total 7 15 21 18 26 87
Nagore
Male 9 2 26 28 25 90
Female 1 6 10 25 19  61
Total 10 8 36 53 44 151
Gyaha
Male 16 22 54 26 10 128
Female 1 11 47 30 16 105
Total 17 33 101 56 26 233
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TABLE  5-2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEALTH RANKING AND SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS: BEPOASE
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5
(N = 7) (N = 15) (N = 21) (N = 18) (N = 26)
Average age 58.7 47.9 43.1 39.3 27.3
Average years of schooling 6.4 6.4 6.0 6.7 6.8
Number of land purchasers 1 0 3 0 0
(excluding land acquisition (14)  (0)  (14)  (0)  (0)
from traditional chiefs)
Number of landholdersa 6 13 15 12 12
(86)  (87)  (71)  (67)  (46)
Average score of landholdingsb 3.9 3.2 2.1 2.5 1.7
Average cocoa yield (bagsc) 21.0 11.3 3.4 1.9 0.6
Number of cocoa producers 6 15 17 17 14
(86)  (100)  (81)  (94)  (54)
Number of farmers using tenantsd 5 1 3 3 0
(71)  (7)  (14)  (17)  (0)
Number of tenantsd 1 6 8 5 6
(14)  (40)  (38)  (28)  (23)
Cases of using wage labor 7 12 13 11 11
(100)  (80)  (62)  (61)  (42)
Cases of engaging in wage labor 0 0 3 7 16
(0)  (0)  (14)  (39)  (62)
Cases of using nnoboa 0 0 1 4 10
(0)  (0)  (5)  (22)  (38)
Cases of employment 3 3 2 1 0
in the formal sector  (43)  (20)  (9)  (6)  (0)
Cases of non-farm economic 2 1 1 2 1
activities in the informal sector  (29)  (7)  (5)  (11)  (4)
Number of unmarried farmers 0 3 6 13 12
(single, divorced, bereaved)  (0)  (20)  (29)  (72)  (46)
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are percentages.
2. N = number of farmers in the wealth rank.
a Including joint holdings by lineage.
b Landholdings are scored as follows: 1 = landless, 2 = under 1ha, 3 = 1–4 ha, 4 = 5–9
ha, 5 = 10 ha or over.
c One bag = 64 kg. Figures for share contracts denote tenant share only.
d Cocoa share-contract tenants.
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TABLE  5-3
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEALTH RANKING AND SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS: NAGORE
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5
(N = 10) (N = 8) (N = 36) (N = 53) (N = 44)
Average age 53.6 51.4 44.4 45.0 42.2
Average years of schooling 6.9 3.8 7.4  4.2 3.8
Number of land purchasers 3 3 5 1 0
(excluding land acquisition (30)  (38)  (14)  (2)  (0)
from traditional chiefs)
Number of landholdersa 10 6 19 32 14
(100)  (75)  (53)  (60)  (32)
Average score of landholdingsb 3.7 3.1 2.1 2.3 1.7
Average cocoa yield (bagsc) 29.2 13.1 6.8 3.1 1.5
Number of cocoa producers 10 7 25 37 19
(100)  (88)  (69)  (70)  (43)
Number of farmers using tenantsd 6 3 7 12 6
(60)  (38)  (19)  (23)  (14)
Number of tenantsd 4 2 19 21 21
(40)  (25)  (53)  (40)  (48)
Cases of using wage labor 9 8 25 34 21
(90)  (100)  (69)  (64)  (48)
Cases of engaging in wage labor 0 0 7 9 22
(0)  (0)  (19)  (17)  (50)
Cases of using nnoboa 0 0 9 14 19
(0)  (0)  (25)  (26)  (43)
Cases of employment in 4 0 4 1 0
the formal sector  (40)  (0)  (11)  (2)  (0)
Cases of nonfarm economic 1 1 0 3 1
activities in the informal sector  (10)  (13)  (0)  (6)  (2)
Number of unmarried farmers 1 2 6 12 13
(single, divorced, bereaved)  (10)  (25)  (17)  (23)  (30)
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are percentages.
2. N = number of farmers in the wealth rank.
a Including joint holdings by lineage.
b Landholdings are scored as follows: 1 = landless, 2 = under 1ha, 3 = 1–4 ha, 4 = 5–9
ha, 5 = 10 ha or over.
c One bag = 64 kg. Figures for share contracts denote tenant share only.
d Cocoa share-contract tenants.
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TABLE  5-4
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEALTH RANKING AND SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS: GYAHA
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5
(N = 17) (N = 33) (N = 101) (N = 56) (N = 26)
Average age 53.1 47.1 42.2 36.1 36.5
Average years of schooling 5.1 5.6 5.1 3.8 3.3
Number of land purchasers 5 1 3 0 0
(excluding land acquisition (29)  (3)  (3)  (0)  (0)
from traditional chiefs)
Number of landholdersa 15 17 31 7 2
(88) (52)  (31) (13) (8)
Average score of landholdingsb 4.3 2.3 1.7 1.2 1.1
Average cocoa yield (bagsc) 20.3 7.0 5.3 3.7 2.3
Number of cocoa producers 17 33 88 42 16
(100)  (100)  (87)  (75)  (62)
Number of farmers using tenantsd 9 5 7 2 1
(53)  (15)  (7)  (4)  (4)
Number of tenantsd 8 18 63 33 11
(47)  (55)  (62)  (59)  (42)
Cases of using wage labor 15 25 51 19 6
(88)  (76)  (50)  (34)  (23)
Cases of engaging in wage labor 1 1 10 16 10
(6)  (3)  (10)  (29)  (38)
Cases of using nnoboa 1 3 21 10 6
(6)  (9)  (21)  (18)  (23)
Cases of employment in 2 6 4 1 0
the formal sector (12)  (18)  (4)  (2)  (0)
Cases of non-farm economic 2 11 42 22  6
activities in the informal sector (12)  (33)  (42)  (39)  (23)
Number of unmarried farmers 2 2 12 18 11
(single, divorced, bereaved)  (12)  (6)  (12)  (32)  (42)
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are percentages.
2. N = number of farmers in the wealth rank.
a Including joint holdings by lineage.
b Landholdings are scored as follows: 1 = landless, 2 = under 1ha, 3 = 1–4 ha, 4 = 5–9
ha, 5 = 10 ha or over.
c One bag = 64 kg. Figures for share contracts denote tenant share only.
d Cocoa share-contract tenants.
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1 (Table 5-5). Likewise, farmers with greater cocoa yield tend to be concen-
trated in the higher ranks (Table 5-6). Thus there is a definite general trend that
farmers in higher ranks tend to hold more land of larger size and enjoy higher
cocoa yield than those in lower ranks.
What causes such inequality in the scale of landholdings (and in the result-
ant cocoa yields) that is closely related to farmer economic status? Is it that
wealthy farmers accumulate land by purchasing it from poor farmers, result-
ing in the polarization of landholdings? Or is the inequality caused by other
factors?
It is unlikely that the inequality in the size of landholding is the result of
land purchasing by larger landholders from other villagers. There are three
reasons for this. First, land purchasing has been infrequent in the study vil-
lages (see Chapter 3). Second, the percentage of large landholders (holding
more than 10 hectares) who acquired land by purchasing from individuals is
zero in Bepoase and Nagore and 29 per cent in Gyaha. This shows that most
large landholders do not accumulate land through purchases from other vil-
TABLE  5-5
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEALTH RANKING AND LANDHOLDING
(No. of farmers)
Landless Under 1 Ha 1–4 Ha 5–9 Ha 10 Ha or Over
Bepoase
Rank 1 (N = 7) 1 (14) 0 (0) 3 (43) 0 (0) 4 (57)
Rank 2 (N = 15) 0 (0) 3 (20) 4 (27) 1 (7) 4 (27)
Rank 3 (N = 21) 6 (29) 8 (38) 5 (24) 0 (0) 1 (5)
Rank 4 (N = 18) 6 (33) 3 (17) 6 (33) 0 (0) 3 (17)
Rank 5 (N = 26) 14 (54) 8 (31) 3 (12) 0 (0) 1 (4)
Nagore
Rank 1 (N = 10) 0 (0) 0 (0) 6 (60) 1 (10) 3 (30)
Rank 2 (N = 8) 2 (25) 0 (0) 2 (25) 3 (38) 1 (13)
Rank 3 (N = 36) 18 (50) 3 (8) 12 (33) 1 (3) 2 (6)
Rank 4 (N = 53) 21 (40) 4 (8) 19 (36) 7 (13) 1 (2)
Rank 5 (N = 44) 29 (66) 3 (7) 11 (25) 0 (0) 1 (2)
Gyaha
Rank 1 (N = 17) 2 (12) 0 (0) 1 (6) 2 (12) 12 (71)
Rank 2 (N = 33) 16 (49) 3 (9) 5 (15) 7 (21) 2 (6)
Rank 3 (N = 101) 70 (69) 7 (7) 16 (16) 4 (4) 4 (4)
Rank 4 (N = 56) 49 (88) 3 (5) 4 (7) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Rank 5 (N = 26) 24 (92) 2 (8) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Notes: 1. Due to the unavailability of data, the total for a rank may not coincide with
its N.
2. Figures in parentheses are percentages.
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TABLE  5-6
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEALTH RANKING AND COCOA YIELD
(No. of farmers)
No Yield Under 10 Bags 10–19 Bags 20–29 Bags 30 Bags or Over
Bepoase
Rank 1 (N = 7) 1 (14) 1 (14) 2 (29) 1 (14) 2 (29)
Rank 2 (N = 15) 4 (27)  5 (33) 1 (7) 3 (20) 2 (13)
Rank 3 (N = 21) 9 (43) 10 (48) 1 (5) 1 (5) 0 (0)
Rank 4 (N = 18) 9 (50) 7 (39) 2 (11) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Rank 5 (N = 26) 23 (88) 3 (12) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Nagore
Rank 1 (N = 10) 1 (10) 2 (20) 2 (20) 1 (1) 4 (40)
Rank 2 (N = 8) 1 (13) 3 (38) 2 (25) 1 (13) 1 (13)
Rank 3 (N = 36) 8 (22) 16 (44) 8 (22) 3 (8) 0 (0)
Rank 4 (N = 53) 19 (36) 30 (57) 3 (57) 1 (2) 0 (0)
Rank 5 (N = 44) 26 (59) 17 (39) 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Gyaha
Rank 1 (N = 17) 1 (6) 3 (18) 7 (41) 3 (18) 3 (18)
Rank 2 (N = 33) 6 (18) 19 (58) 6 (18) 2 (6) 0 (0)
Rank 3 (N = 101) 34 (34) 51 (50) 14 (14) 2 (2) 0 (0)
Rank 4 (N = 56) 31 (55) 23 (41) 2 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Rank 5 (N = 26) 18 (69) 8 (31) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Notes: 1. Figures for share contracts denote tenant share only.
2. Due to the unavailability of data, the total for a rank may not coincide with
its N.
3. Figures in parentheses are percentages.
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lagers. Third, those who purchased land have not been limited to farmers in
the highest wealth ranks (Tables 5-2 through 5-4). Thus there has not been a
process of polarization in which higher-ranking farmers accumulate land
through purchases and smaller landholders become landless by selling their
land.
The present inequalities in landholding appear to be the results of the
concentration of land in a small number of first-generation migrants. Most
large landholders and farmers placed in wealth rank 1 are first-generation
migrants who in early years acquired large pieces of land directly from the
traditional divisional chiefs, or those who have acquired land through gifting
or inheritance from first-generation migrants. For instance, of seven farmers
in wealth rank 1 in both Bepoase and Nagore who held land of over 10
hectares, five were first-generation migrants who had directly acquired land
from the traditional chiefs. The remaining two were a son and a grandson of
first-generation migrants. Likewise, of eleven Gyaha farmers in wealth rank 1
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holding over 10 hectares of land, seven had acquired their land through gifting
or inheritance from relatives who were first-generation migrants.
In recent years there is little uncultivated land left and there are few possi-
bilities of acquiring a large plot of land from the traditional chiefs. Most of the
land obtainable directly from the traditional chiefs has been exhausted, and
once land is acquired by individuals or lineages, it is rarely transferred to
others through purchases. Therefore, whether one can acquire a large piece of
land in the future depends primarily on whether his or her relatives are first-
generation migrants who acquired a large piece of land.
While there is a close relationship between economic inequality and the
scale of landholding in the study villages, there were a few cases of villagers
who, though landless, were placed in wealth rank 1. Such villagers fall into
two classifications. One was tenants engaged in large-scale farming. A land-
less tenant in Gyaha, for example, was managing a cocoa farm of over 10
hectares under a yemayenkye contract and another farm of over 2 hectares
under a nhwesoo contract. The combined cocoa yield from these two farms
exceeded 1 ton. Another category of landless villagers placed in wealth rank 1
were the purchasing clerks of the Produce Buying Company (PBC). The
purchasing clerk in Bepoase, for example, operated a passenger transportation
business in his hometown using a mini-bus he owned.
Some people were placed in wealth rank 4 and 5 despite the fact that they
held over 10 hectares of land. There were two very different categories of such
low-ranking farmers. One was young farmers from rich households. There
were four such farmers in Bepoase (three males and one female) who were all
unmarried and aged from twenty-six to thirty-one. They had become land-
holders after 1990 through gifting or inheritance and then started planting
cocoa. As their cocoa trees were young, their cocoa yields were virtually zero
which placed them in the lower wealth ranks. But these young farmers were
able to acquire large pieces of land through gifting or inheritance from first-
generation migrants who were in wealth ranks 1 and 2. Although the four
young farmers were in the lower wealth ranks as individuals, they were
members of wealthy families, and their fathers were all big landholders.
Consequently, they are likely to acquire more land through gifting or inherit-
ance from their fathers in the future. In addition, these four young farmers can
expect greater income as their cocoa trees mature. Thus although placed in the
lower wealth ranks, they will be able to raise their economic position as they
progress through the stages of their life cycle. For this reason they can be
regarded as the “latent wealthy farmers.”
The second category of large landholders placed in the lower wealth ranks
were old female farmers. This was the case of two women in Nagore, aged
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fifty-six and sixty-nine. The former woman inherited a piece of land, includ-
ing a cocoa farm, from her mother in 1990. But as the farm was inadequately
managed, it yielded only two bags of cocoa. The latter woman held a cocoa
farm received from her husband around 1975. Due to the aging of the trees,
she did not get much yield. The two women had two points in common. First,
they had to rely on wage labor or tenants to obtain the necessary labor because
of their physical weakness and lack of labor in their households. Second, the
yields from their cocoa farms were modest because of the inadequate mainte-
nance of the farm. Thus the category of young farmers found in Bepoase and
of the old female farmers in Nagore, which were large landholders placed in
the lower wealth ranks, differed significantly from each other in their socio-
economic characteristics.
In summary, the wealth ranking of the individual farmers is, in general,
closely related to the state of their landholdings. Many large landholders in
the highest wealth ranks are first-generation migrants who acquired land
directly from the traditional chiefs in earlier years. The analysis also revealed
that villagers placed in wealth rank 1 included some landless people. Such
people were either cocoa-purchasing clerks or tenants who were engaged in
large-scale farming operations. The lower wealth ranks included some large-
scale landholders. They were either young “latent wealthy farmers” who can
expect a rise in their wealth status in the future, or aged female farmers who
have little prospect of improving their economic status.
2. Use of Labor and Economic Inequality
A close relationship can also be observed between the wealth ranking of
individuals and their labor deployment strategies. The following section dis-
cusses this relationship focusing on both the user and the supplier of farm
labor (Tables 5-2 through 5-4). It also looks at the relationship between wealth
ranks and nonfarm employment.
(1) Wealth Ranks and Agricultural Wage Labor
The percentage of farmers in the study villages who used wage labor (daily-
wage and task-contracted labor) was higher among those placed in higher
wealth ranks. The larger size of the farms and the greater availability of
financial resources among farmers in higher ranks may explain this. This does
not mean, however, that the farmers in the lower wealth ranks did not use
wage labor. The combined percentage of farmers using wage labor in wealth
ranks 4 and 5 stood at 39 per cent. This indicates that some farmers in lower
ranks had to compliment their insufficient labor with wage labor, particularly
for strength-demanding farm tasks such as tree cutting and weeding.
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Another means for farmers to cope with labor shortages is to organize
nnoboa labor exchange groups. The percentage of farmers using nnoboa
increased as their wealth ranking went down. Nnoboa is used more frequently
by poorer farmers because one does not need any cash to obtain needed farm
labor. In general, farmers in the higher wealth ranks cope with labor shortages
by using wage labor, while those in the lower wealth ranks rely on both wage
labor and nnoboa.
Among the farmers in the lower wealth ranks using wage labor and nnoboa,
there is an important difference in labor deployment strategies between male
and female farmers. As Table 5-7 shows, male farmers tend to use more
nnoboa labor while female farmers rely more on wage labor. This is because
female farmers cannot obtain male labor through nnoboa, for which men and
women form separate groups. Farmers need male labor for strength-demand-
ing tasks such as tree felling, and male farmers can obtain the necessary labor
for such tasks through nnoboa. Female farmers cannot. Consequently, female
farmers in the lower wealth ranks who have no other means of procuring male
labor, have to rely on wage labor.
There is also an interrelationship between the supplier of wage labor and
wealth ranks. The lower the rank, the more farmers are engaged in wage labor.
This suggests that farmers in lower wealth ranks are likely to complement
TABLE  5-7
USE OF AGRICULTURAL WAGE LABOR AND NNOBOA BY FARMERS IN RANKS 4 AND 5
(No. of farmers)
Male Female
Use of agricultural wage labor
Bepoase 8 (30) 14 (82)
Nagore 22 (42) 18 (41)
Gyaha 8 (22) 17 (37)
Total 38 (33) 49 (46)
Use of nnoboa
Bepoase 14 (52) 0 (0)
Nagore 23 (43) 10 (23)
Gyaha 15 (42) 1 (2)
Total 52 (45) 11 (10)
Use of agricultural wage labor or nnoboa
Bepoase 18 (67) 14 (82)
Nagore 33 (62) 21 (48)
Gyaha 19 (53) 18 (39)
Total 70 (60) 53 (50)
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages.
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their insufficient income by engaging in wage labor. The percentage of farm-
ers engaged in wage labor was higher among men than among women in all
three villages (88 per cent in Bepoase, 68 per cent in Nagore, and 82 per cent
in Gyaha). This may be explained by the fact that the employers preferred
male labor particularly for strength-demanding farm tasks.
As has been explained, wage labor is supplied more by farmers in the lower
wealth ranks and is used more by farmers in the higher wealth ranks. How-
ever, this does not mean that there is a complete separation of the labor-
demanding class from the labor-supplying class. Although wage labor is
supplied more by farmers in the lower wealth ranks, these labor-supplying
farmers often hire wage labor to work on their own farms when necessary.
Farmers who engage in wage labor and at the same time were the hirers of
wage labor accounted for 38 per cent of all farmers (23 per cent in Bepoase,
63 per cent in Nagore, and 24 per cent in Gyaha). Among the labor-supplying
farmers, men were more numerous than women, and among lower-ranking
farmers in Bepoase and Nagore, women tend to hire wage labor more fre-
quently than men (Table 5-7). These trends suggest two facts. First, not a few
farmers in the lower wealth ranks use wage labor on their own farms, while
engaging in wage labor on other people’s farms. Second, male farmers tend to
be on the labor-supplying side, whereas female farmers tend to be on the
labor-demanding side.
(2) Wealth Ranks and Tenancy Contract
The percentage of farmers who used share tenants on their farms under
nhwesoo or yemayenkye contracts was higher in the higher wealth ranks,
especially in Rank 1. On the other hand, some farmers in Ranks 4 and 5 also
used share tenants, as shown in Table 5-8. Of male farmers using share
tenants, 80 per cent were over the age of sixty which suggests that they relied
on tenants because they no longer had the physical strength to work on their
farms. By contrast, female farmers in all age categories relied on tenants. The
reliance of young women on tenants probably stems from the fact that they
have to engage in reproductive work (such as household tasks and child
rearing) as well as in economic activities other than farming (such as trading),
resulting in less time available for farm work. Thus the reasons of using share
tenants by male and female farmers in lower wealth ranks appear to be differ-
ent.
Tables 5-2 through 5-4 show that there were farmers in all the wealth ranks
who worked as tenants in cocoa production on other people’s farms. However,
there were two qualitative differences between the tenants in the higher wealth
ranks and those in the lower ranks (Table 5-9). First, most of the tenants in the
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highest wealth rank (85 per cent) were landholding tenants, whereas only 11
per cent of the tenants in the lowest wealth rank were landholders. Second,
those tenants in the highest wealth rank were all under yemayenkye contracts
and none were under nhwesoo contracts only, whereas 42 per cent of the
tenants in the lowest wealth rank worked only under nhwesoo contracts. As
was discussed in Section II of Chapter 2, the land rights secured under a
yemayenkye contract are long-lasting and stable, often including future possi-
bilities of land acquisition. In contrast, the land rights under a nhwesoo con-
tract are short-term usufruct rights. This seems to suggest that the tenants in
the highest wealth rank, who already hold their own land, are expanding their
farm acreage further by means of yemayenkye contracts. On the other hand,
farmers in the lowest rank while including those who have relatively stable
land rights under yemayenkye contracts also include many who have only
nhwesoo contracts.
(3) Wealth Ranks and Nonfarm Employment
The survey also found some important facts about the relationship between
TABLE  5-8
FARMERS IN RANKS 4 AND 5 WHO EMPLOY TENANTS: DISTRIBUTION
BY SEX AND AGE (THREE-VILLAGE TOTAL)
(No. of farmers)
Age
Total Average
20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60– Age
Male 0 1 0 1 8 10 69.8
Female 1 3 3 4 3 14 49.4
Total 1 4 3 5 11 24 57.9
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TABLE  5-9
CLASSIFICATION OF TENANTS IN RANKS 1 AND 5 (THREE-VILLAGE TOTAL)
(No. of tenants)
Rank 1 Rank 5
(N = 13) (N = 38)
Landholding tenants 11 (85) 4 (11)
Nhwesoo tenants 2 (15) 30 (79)
Yemayenkye tenants 13 (100) 22 (58)
Tenants under nhwesoo only 0 (0) 16 (42)
Note: 1. Figures in parentheses are percentages.
2. N = number of tenants in the rank.
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nonfarm employment and wealth ranks. One was that employees in the formal
sector (such as teachers and purchasing clerks of cocoa-purchasing company)
were primarily men who were in wealth ranks 1 and 2, as shown in Table 5-10.
Only two women were found in this sector. By contrast, there were farmers
from all the wealth ranks working in the informal sector. It should be pointed
out, however, that the type of informal income earning activities in higher
wealth ranks differed from that in lower ranks. Most of the villagers earning
income by using equipment that require capital investment, such as those
engaged in passenger transportation using their own cars and those earning
fees from their own chainsaws and flour mills, belonged to higher wealth
ranks. The nonfarm income earning activities of those in other wealth ranks
were all small-scale businesses such as retailing, hairdressing, carpentry, and
masonry.
In summary, the above analysis using wealth ranks indicates that a close
relationship exists between a farmer’s wealth status on the one hand and his/
her labor deployment strategies, tenancy contracts, and nonfarm economic
activities on the other. Farmers in higher wealth ranks frequently use wage
labor on the strength of their financial resources, whereas farmers in lower
wealth ranks make up for their insufficient labor by means of nnoboa labor as
well as wage labor. Among farmers in lower wealth ranks, men tend to use
more nnoboa labor and women more wage labor. It was also shown that the
suppliers of wage labor are found more among farmers in the lower wealth
TABLE  5-10
NONFARM EMPLOYMENT BY SEX AND WEALTH RANK (THREE-VILLAGE TOTAL)
(No. of persons)
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 5
Male
N 32 34 91 65 51
Formal sector 9 9 9 2 0
(28) (26) (10) (3) (0)
Informal sector 9 3 13 9 3
(28) (9) (14) (14) (6)
Female
N 2 22 67 62 45
Formal sector 0 0 1 1 0
(0) (0) (1) (2) (0)
Informal sector 1 10 30 18 5
(50) (45) (45) (29) (11)
Note: 1. Figures in parentheses are percentages.
2. N = number of persons in the wealth rank.
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ranks, but these labor-supplying farmers also hire wage labor at times to work
on their own farms. There is, therefore, no definite separation between the
labor-demanding class and the labor-supplying class of wage labor. Farmers
who work as tenants are found in all the wealth ranks, but those in the higher
wealth ranks intend to expand the size of their farms through share contracts,
while those in the lower wealth ranks often depend only on tenancy contracts
for a living. Finally, nonfarm employment in the formal sector and nonfarm
economic activities using equipment requiring capital investment can be seen
among the farmers in the higher wealth ranks, and most of these people are
male. In contrast, small-scale informal economic activities are the main source
of nonfarm income for farmers in the lower wealth ranks.
3. Direction of Change in the Wealth Status Structure
(1) Future of Farmers in the Lower Wealth Ranks
The structure of economic inequality discussed above is not fixed and can
change over time. An important factor influencing economic status is the life
cycle of a farmer. The results of the wealth-ranking survey show a correlation
between a farmer’s age and wealth status (Tables 5-2 through 5-4). This
indicates that a farmer’s wealth status can improve in the course of his/her life
cycle.
There are many reasons why an individual’s economic status improves with
the changes in life cycles.1 For one thing, the opportunities to acquire land
(and cocoa farms) through gifting or inheritance increase as a farmer becomes
older, thus helping to raise his/her income. Another major factor is the nature
of cocoa farming. Newly planted cocoa trees have very little yield for the first
five years. After about ten years, however, their yield begins to increase, and
they will remain productive for the next twenty to thirty years. Even if a young
farmer obtains a large plot of land and starts planting cocoa trees, he or she has
to wait up to a decade for the yield from those trees to start increasing (as was
the case with the young large-scale landholders in Bepoase, discussed ear-
lier). Consequently, a farmer who invested labor and capital in a farm while
young will be rewarded with stable harvests when he or she reaches middle or
old age. This is one reason why a farmer’s economic status rises with age.
Another important factor influencing economic status is the existence of
indigenous institutions that enable farmers to improve their status by shifting
to more advantageous contracts. For instance, newly arrived migrants without
any capital or relatives in the village may earn their living by initially entering
into annual labor contracts. As they become experienced with cocoa farming,
they can enter into more advantageous nhwesoo or yemayenkye contracts. The
latter contract ensures greater cocoa income as the trees grow, and can help
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tenants to become landholders through land-dividing arrangements (Chapter
2). In this way, even migrant farmers without land or capital, or without
landholding relatives in the village, can gradually improve their economic
status by shifting to more profitable contracts. Of the farmers in the lowest
wealth rank in the study villages, 58 per cent of them worked under yemayenkye
contracts. Some of them could become owner-cultivators in the future through
land-dividing yemayenkye. Even if the contracts do not include land-dividing
arrangements, a tenant’s rights in a cocoa farm are long-lasting, stable, and
inheritable. The existence of indigenous institutions, such as the yemayenkye
contract, thus opens the possibility for landless villagers to improve their
economic status.
(2) Future of Farmers in the Higher Wealth Ranks
It is possible for farmers in the lower wealth ranks to improve their eco-
nomic status over time. What is the situation for farmers in the higher wealth
ranks?
Hill (1963, 1970) pointed out that the economic orientation of migrant
farmers in earlier years was capitalistic because they reinvested their income
from cocoa production to accumulate land. Consequently, many farmers in
those days held multiple pieces of land. Because enough land was still avail-
able in the first half of the twentieth century, it was possible for wealthy
farmers to expand the scale of their operations by reinvesting their earnings to
acquire more land.
By the 1990s, however, further accumulation of land by wealthy farmers
had become more difficult because there remained little uncultivated land that
could be directly acquired from the traditional divisional chiefs, and because
the land once acquired by individuals or lineages is rarely transferred to
strangers through purchase. In the study villages there were a few farmers in
the highest wealth rank who reinvested the profits from cocoa production to
acquire more land. However, most of the land purchases took place in earlier
years (in the 1960s or before). In recent years, due partly to increasing popu-
lation pressure, land is not readily available for purchase, making it difficult
for wealthy farmers to use their profits to buy land.
There has also been a tendency in recent years for individual landholdings
to shrink in the course of generational change. As discussed in Section IV of
Chapter 3, many plots of land held by individuals have been divided up for
gifting or inheritance because of the multiple claims to the land from different
parties (including wives, children, and matrilineal relatives). The large tracts
of land held by first-generation migrants in the highest wealth rank are likely
to be divided up when transferred to descendants through gifting or inherit-
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ance. The combined trends of the decreasing land obtainable from the tradi-
tional divisional chiefs and the growing division of land through gifting and
inheritance seem to indicate a slow process of equalizing landholdings among
villagers, in contrast to the emergence of capitalistic farmers through land
accumulation as observed by Hill in earlier years.
In summary, two trends of change can be seen in the structure of wealth
among farmers in the study villages. One is that some farmers in the lowest
wealth ranks are likely to improve their economic status in the future. The
other is that it is becoming difficult for farmers in the higher wealth ranks to
accumulate land, and their landholdings are being fragmented with genera-
tional change. These trends suggest the possibility that the structure of eco-
nomic inequality in the study villages is heading toward the equalization of
economic status instead of a bipolarization between big landholders with
expanding farms on one side and utterly landless farmers on the other.
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis of the structure of economic inequality in the study
villages has revealed that the state of landholding, labor relations, tenancy
contracts, and nonfarm income earning activities are all closely related to
farmer economic status. It has also been pointed out that important qualitative
differences in terms of gender and age exist among the villagers, and such
differences are correlated with economic status. It has also been argued that
the present structure of economic inequality is not fixed, is likely to change
over time, and that there are indigenous circumstances and institutions con-
cerned with landholding that are promoting the equalization of wealth status.
Before closing this chapter, the limitation of the method adopted in the
present study for analyzing the dynamic state of economic inequality in Ghana’s
rural areas needs to be mentioned. As the aim of the present study has been to
analyze the economic inequality within the study villages, it cannot grasp the
dynamic state of economic inequality for the whole of rural Ghana. Conse-
quently, the analysis cannot include rural capitalists holding many pieces of
land in more than one place in Ghana, or rural industrialists accumulating
capital who reside outside the study villages. Therefore, it is possible that the
process of equalizing economic status observed in the study villages is only a
partial picture of a broader process of widening economic inequalities. Whether
or not such a process is taking place in rural Ghana as a whole is beyond the
scope of this study.
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Note
1 It is not clear whether the economic status of farmers is interrelated with changes
in the demographic composition of the household, as pointed out by Chayanov
(1986). As has been noted, in rural Ghana there is more than one production unit
within the household. Consequently, an increase in the number of workers within
a household does not always lead to an increase in labor available for a household
member’s farm (or an increase in the scale of operation or earnings). In addition,
the availability of family labor is not the sole factor determining the amount of
total labor available, because labor other than household labor (such as wage
labor and tenant labor) is used in cocoa production. Thus, a simplistic model of
linking the demographic cycle of a household with wealth status (arguing that
advancing age leads to increases in available family labor, resulting in a larger
scale of farming operations and increased income) does not apply to the actual
situation in the study villages.
